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STRENGTH OF REVIEW AND SCALE OF 
RESPONSE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL UNIVERSAL 
PERIODIC REVIEW ON CHINA 
Junxiang Mao & Xi Shengt 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose 
On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/ 
251 to create the Human Rights Council (HRC).1 The purpose was to re-
dress the shortcomings in the UN Commission on Human Rights' work, 
and to recognize "the importance of ensuring universality, objectivity and 
non-selectivity in the consideration of human rights issues, and the elimina-
tion of double standards and politicization." 2 The Resolution also estab-
lished the general outline of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
mechanism. 3 On June 18, 2007, the HRC adopted Resolution 5/1 to finalize 
the modalities of the UPR.4 According to this resolution, the UPR mecha-
nism shall promote the "universality" and "indivisibility" of human rights, 
through "interactive dialogue" and "cooperative mechanism," and shall re-
view the human rights situation of all states in an "objective," "non-selec-
tive," "non-confrontational and non-politicized manner."
5 
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1. See G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, (Aug 
7, 2007). 
5. Id. at [ 3. 
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China and the UPR is not just a significant scholarly subject but a case 
study of the UPR's strengths and weaknesses, particularly with respect to a 
very powerful state. On the one hand, China actively participated in the 
HRC's establishment and capacity building. China frequently criticized the 
Commission on Human Rights' country-specific review process. 6 China 
claimed "the Commission was moving increasingly further away from its 
original objective of promoting international cooperation in the field of 
human rights, and reform was therefore necessary." 7 HRC Resolution 5/1 
emphasized the UPR should ensure "universal coverage and equal treatment 
of all States" using a "cooperative mechanism" based on "interactive dia-
logue"; this basically accords with China's fundamental positions.8 There-
fore, when it ran for an HRC seat for the third time in 2013, China stated it 
''engages constructively in the institutional building of the Human Rights 
Council, the universal periodic review and consideration of all the items 
before the Council." 9 On the other hand, China's rising power has complex 
impacts on other states' attitudes toward China's performance in the UPR. 
As Bjorn Ahl has said, "China's influence is also reflected in the change of 
tone by most statements and recommendations." 0 Inevitably, China's influ-
ence and performance in the UPR are the focus of international attention. 
The second cycle of the UPR concluded in 2016. As of 2015, the HRC 
has performed two UPR cycles on China. This raises several questions: To 
what extent does the HRC review the human rights situation in states, like 
China, that actively support UPR and have increasing power in the interna-
tional community? To what extent does China respond to recommendations 
from others states in the UPR? Is the extent of China's responses consistent 
with that of its position in support of the UPR? This Article presents an-
swers to those questions. Section I presents the Article's purpose, back-
ground, and methodology. Section II introduces two cycles of the HRC's 
review of China. Section III describes recommending states' concentration 
on China's human rights issues and its variations. Section IV discusses the 
actions requested by recommendations to China. Section V discusses 
China's responses to those recommendations. Section VI, relying on the 
6. See UNHCR, 61st Sess., 20th mtg. at [ 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.20 (Apr. 
8, 2005); UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 52d mtg., at ¶ 15, UN Doc. A/C.3/61/SR.52 (Jan. 18,
2007). 
7. E/CN.4/2005/SR.20, supra note 6, at ¶ 17. 
8. See Rhona K.M. Smith, Form over Substance? China's Contribution to Human 
Rights through Universal Periodic Review, 17 ASIAN Y.B. OF INT'L. L. 85, 89 (2011). 
9. Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of 
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/68/90 (June 5, 2013). 
10. Bjorn Ahl, The Rise of China and International Human Rights Law, 37 Hum. 
RTS. Q. 637, 660 (2015). 
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results of quantitative analysis, makes comments on the UPR and China's 
performance. Section VII concludes. 
B. Background and Methodology 
The UPR has become a hot topic in academia since it came into being. 
Scholars have provided inconsistent evaluations and comments on the UPR 
through analyses of the UPR's reviews of the United States," the United 
Kingdom,1 2 Canada,13 Spain,1 4 Singapore,' 5 Malaysia, 16 Egypt, 7 the Pacific 
Island states,' 8 African countries,1 9 and the five permanent members of the 
Security Council.2 0 Laura K. Landolt has pointed out "the Egyptian case 
suggests that the relative success of NGO externalization and internalization 
strategies at the UPR depends on a number of crucial domestic condi-
tions." 2 1 Leanne Cochrane and Kathryn McNeilly argue "it is difficult to 
quantify the specific contribution of the UPR mechanism given that a num-
ber of domestic and international political and legal pressures are often also 
11. See John R. Crook (ed.), InternationalHuman Rights: U.S. Human Rights 
Record Assessed in UN Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review Process, 105 
ASIAN J. OF INT'L. L. 139 (2013). 
12. See Leanne Cochrane & Kathryn McNeilly, The United Kingdom, the United 
Nations Human Rights Counciland the Firstcycle of the UniversalPeriodicReview, 17 
INT'L J. HUM. RTs.152 (2013). 
13. See Joanna Harrington, Canada, the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
and Universal PeriodicReview, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM 79 (2009). 
14. See Bjorn Arp, Lessons Learnedfrom Spain's Practicebefore the UnitedNa-
tions Human Rights Reporting Mechanism: Treaty Bodies and UniversalPeriodicRe-
view, 15 SPANISH Y.B. OF INT'L. L. 1 (2011). 
15. See Mahdev Mohan, Singapore and the Universal PeriodicReview: An Un-
precedentedHuman Rights Assessment,3 J. E. ASIA & INT'L. L. 365 (2010). 
16. See Ying Hooi Khoo, MalaysiaHuman Rights Performance:Assessment of its 
FirstSession of Universal PeriodicReview in the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil, 6 COSMOPOLITAN CIv. SOCIETIES: INTERDISC. J. 19 (2014). 
17. See Laura K. Landolt, Externalizing Human Rights: From Commission to 
Council, the Universal PeriodicReview and Egypt, 14 Hum. RTS. REv. 107 (2013). 
18. See Rhona K.M. Smith, The Pacific IslandStates: Themes Emergingfrom the 
United Nations Human Rights Council's Inaugural Universal Periodic Review?, 13 
MELBOURNE J. INT'L. L. 1 (2012). 
19. See Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States 
and the Universal PeriodicReview of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 
Hum. RTs. L. REv. 1 (2009). 
20. See Rhona K.M. Smith, "To see Themselves as others see Them": The Five 
PermanentMembers of the Security Counciland the Human Rights Council's Universal 
PeriodicReview, 35 Hum. RTs. Q. 1 (2013). 
21. See Landolt, supra note 17, at 126. 
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willing the same result." 22 Other scholars have made broadly positive com-
ments on the UPR.2 3 For example, John Carey emphasizes the "Council's 
innovative Universal Periodic Review is like a breath of fresh air. UPR is 
genuinely innovative, positive, and encouraging." 24 
In Human Rights and the UniversalPeriodicReview: Rituals andRitu-
alism, scholars with various backgrounds analyzed the rituals and ritualism 
in the UPR and systematically summarized the achievements and defects of 
the first UPR cycle. Roland Chauville, the founder and executive director of 
UPR Info, noted the outcomes of the UPR process were "universality," 
"putting human rights at the forefront of the international and domestic 
agenda," "complementarity with other human rights mechanisms," and "im-
plementation," while its failures were "weak modalities," "lack of follow-
up mechanism," "use [of] recommendations to weaken the process," and 
"lack of responses." 25 Other scholars have commented on the UPR from 
specific perspectives. For example, Jane K. Comana and Julie Billaud ex-
posed political problems in the UPR.2 6 Rosa Freedman pointed out the 
problems of politicization, selectivity, and bias in the UPR. 27 
In terms of China and the UPR, the scholastic focus concentrates on 
China's performance in the UPR and its influence. Some scholars do not 
approve of China's performance in the UPR. For instance, after examining 
China's performance in the first cycle of the review as a recommending 
22. See Cochrane & McNeilly, supra note 12, at 170. 
23. See, e.g., Elvira Domfnguez Redondo, The UniversalPeriodicReview of the 
UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the FirstSession, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L. L. 
721 (2008) [hereinafter Redondo (2008)]; John Carey, The UN Human Rights Council: 
What Would EleanorRoosevelt Say?, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 459 (2009); Alex 
Conte, Reflections and Challenges:Entering into the Second Cycle of Universal Peri-
odic Review Mechanism, 9 N.Z. Y.B. INT'L. L.187 (2001); Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 
The Universal PeriodicReview - Is There Life beyondNaming and Shaming in Human 
Rights Implementation?, 4 N.Z. L. Rev. 673 (2012) [hereinafter Redondo (2012)]; 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM (Hil-
ary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014). 
24. See Carey, supra note 23, at 460. 
25. See Roland Chauville, The Universal Periodic Review's First Cycle: Suc-
cesses and Failures,in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIc REVIEw: RITU-
ALS AND RITUALISM, 87-103 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014). 
26. See Jane K. Cowana & Julie Billaud, Between Learning and Schooling: The 
Politics of Human Rights Monitoring at the Universal Periodic Review, 36 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 1175-90 (2015). 
27. See Rosa Freedman, New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council, 29 
NETH. Q. OF Hum. RTS. 289 (2011) [hereinafter Freedman (2011)]. See also Rosa 
Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the Same? 31 Wis. 
INT'L L. J. 208 (2013) [hereinafter Freedman (2013)]. 
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state and as a State under Review (SuR) in the UPR, Rhona K. M. Smith 
found "China's involvement is a classic case of 'much ado about nothing' -
justifying a fanfare and claims of 'credit' on the international stage, without 
any underpinning substance." 28 Smith also believes "the five permanent 
member states of the Security Council have not acquitted themselves well 
in the field, tending to consider international human rights as something 
applicable to other states." 29 A recent study provides a new way to under-
stand how China makes its impact on the international human rights order. 
The study analyzes China's response to UPR recommendations on its re-
cord and China's recommendations in reviews of other states.30 
This article aims to analyze the UPR and China's performance from a 
different perspective and apply a different research method from that of the 
existing scholarship on this topic. The authors believe the category and 
quality of proposed recommendations determine the strength of the review; 
the attitude of the SuR to recommendations and their outcome determines 
the scale of response. Statistical analyses of the content and category of 
recommendations offered by recommending states, and the rate and varia-
tions of recommendations accepted and implemented by the SuR, furnish an 
empirical foundation for judging a country's performance in the UPR and 
the UPR mechanism itself. 
This kind of empirical analysis is lacking in the works cited above. 
Those works analyzed the UPR mechanism either by researching a single 
state's performance in the UPR or with an abstract analytical method. One 
pair of authors has taken a different approach. Edward McMahon and Marta 
Ascherio, under the support of UPR Info Database, have developed an "Ac-
tion of Category" approach. They have categorized all recommendations in 
the UPR through 2008 and 2009 by framing the type of actions requested 
and statistically analyzed the categories of and issues involved in the rec-
ommendations to each group: including Asia, Africa, The Eastern European 
Group (EEG), the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRU-
LAC), and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).3 1 Based on 
this holistic research and quantitative analysis, McMahon and Ascherio ob-
jectively evaluate the UPR engagement of states belonging to different re-
28. See Smith supra note 8, at 115. 
29. See Smith, supra note 20, at 28. 
30. See Ahl, supra note 10, at 637-61. 
31. See Edward R. McMahon & Marta Ascherio, A Step Ahead in Promoting 
Human Rights? The UniversalPeriodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, 18 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 231-48 (2012). See also Edward R. McMahon, International 
Organizationsand PeerReview: Assessing the Universal PeriodicReview Mechanism 
of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 17 AFRICAN Y.B. OF INT'L. L. 353-77 
(2009). 
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gions by examining the scale and content of proposed recommendations. 
This article follows the same methodological model. 
The starting point of this article is an analysis of how peer states pro-
posed recommendations to China and how China responded to those recom-
mendations by reference to McMahon and Ascherio's Action Category 
approach. The article analyzes statistics regarding: (1) which issues the rec-
ommendations have addressed; (2) the variation of issues through the years; 
(3) each recommendation's action category; (4) China's responses to rec-
ommendations in different categories; and, (5) the variation of those re-
sponses. The authors also evaluate China's performance in the UPR against 
a larger framework by conducting a comparative analysis between the data 
on China and data on the international community as a whole. This pro-
vides new insight into the performance of the UPR mechanism. 
I. THE UPR AND CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN 
Two CYCLES OF THE UPR 
A. Basic process and purposes of the UPR 
The UPR is a "peer review" process, driven by States,32 to review all 
UN member States' human rights records at regular intervals. The UPR is a 
three-stage process. First, the review stage is undertaken by the UPR Work-
ing Group, which consists of the forty-seven members of the Human Rights 
Council. Using a lottery system, the Working Group forms a troika of three 
rapporteurs to facilitate each review and prepare the Working Group's re-
port.33 Each review takes place through an interactive discussion between 
the SuR and other UN Member States. During this discussion, any UN 
Member State can pose questions, comments, and/or make recommenda-
tions to the SuR. The outcome report includes an assessment of the human 
rights situation in the SuR, recommendations proposed to the state, and vol-
untary commitments and pledges made by the state concemed. 34 
Second, the following-up stage requires SuRs to implement the recom-
mendations received during the review. The last stage is an assessment of 
the SuR's implementation efforts at the next review four and one-half years 
32. Kofi Annan, In larger freedom: development, security and human rights for all 
- Addendum: Human Rights Council Explanatory Note, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Addl 
(2005), at 11 6-7. 
33. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at ¶ 18. 
34. See id. at [ 27. 
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later.35 Each State has the opportunity to declare the actions it has taken to 
improve its human rights situation and fulfill its human rights obligations. 
The UPR process emphasizes two primary principles. The first princi-
ple is universal review and equal treatment. This requires periodic and uni-
versal review of each State's fulfillment of its human rights obligations and 
commitments, in a manner that ensures universal coverage and equal treat-
ment of all states. 36 The second principle is human rights cooperation and 
dialogue. According to General Assembly Resolution 60/251, the UPR shall 
be a cooperative mechanism based on interactive dialogue, fully involve the 
SuR, and take full consideration of the country's capacity-building needs. 37 
The process encourages mutual cooperation and confrontation reduction. To 
improve the human rights situations in all States, the process welcomes 
meritorious criticism and supervision. To ensure the objectivity of the re-
view process, the Working Group reviews the SuR's human rights situation 
based on three documents: (1) a national report presented by the State, not 
exceeding twenty pages; (2) a compilation prepared by Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of the information contained in 
the reports of Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures, including the State's 
observations and comments, and other relevant official UN documents, not 
exceeding ten pages; and (3) a summary of credible and reliable informa-
tion provided by other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society, academic 
bodies, and international organizations, prepared by OHCHR and not ex-
ceeding ten pages. 38 
The UPR differs from the state reporting procedure stipulated by UN 
human rights treaties 39 in that the UPR is an intergovernmental "peer re-
view" process while the state reviews under the human rights treaties are 
conducted by a committee comprised of independent experts. The proce-
dures and norms that apply in State Party reviews under the international 
human rights treaties are prescribed by the content of the respective treaties, 
which the State accepts upon ratification. The basis of the UPR review is 
broad; it relies on: (1) the Charter of the United Nations; (2) the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); (3) Human Rights instruments to 
which a State is a party; (4) States' voluntary pledges and commitments, 
including those undertaken when presenting their candidacy for election to 
35. UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW INFO (UPR INFO), ON THE ROAD TO IMPLEMEN-
TATION (2012), http://s.upr-info.org/OnTheRoadtolmpl. 
36. See H.R.C Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at ¶ 3(c). 
37. See G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 1. 
38. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at ¶ 15. 
39. See Rhona K.M. Smith, More of the Same or Something Different? Prelimi-
nary Observations on the Contribution of Universal PeriodicReview with Reference to 
the Chinese Experience, 10 CHINESE J. OF INT'L. L. 565, 568-74 (2011). 
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the HRC; and, (5) applicable international humanitarian law. 4 0 Under this 
mechanism, the universal application of the UN Charter and the UDHR 
puts every State under UPR scrutiny. The UPR's inclusion of the UDHR-
as a statement of international human rights principles according to which 
countries are reviewed-is particularly important because some countries 
have failed to ratify many core international human rights treaties and ac-
cordingly reject responsibility for the full panoply of human rights viola-
tions.41Therefore, as stressed in HRC Resolution 5/1, the UPR is intended 
to "complement and not duplicate other human rights mechanisms." 42 
On September 21, 2007, the HRC in its sixth session adopted a review 
timetable, planning to proceed with the first cycle of the UPR for all 192 
UN members in the course of four years, from 2008 to 2011.43 In 2011 the 
Council adopted Resolution 16/21, making some changes to the UPR pro-
cess." According to the resolution: (1) The second cycle of the review will 
focus on the implementation of the accepted recommendations and the de-
velopments of the human rights situation in SuRs; (2) The whole review 
cycle will last 4.5 years, from 2012 to 2016, to accomplish the review of all 
193 UN members. No country will avoid the UPR 4 5 ; (3) Each State review 
will last 3.5 hours. The SuR will be given 70 minutes and other States 140 
minutes. All statements at the meeting will be recorded. States may propose 
recommendations on human rights situations in SuRs, and SuRs may accept 
or refuse recommendations at the Working Group review meeting or the 
subsequent HRC meeting. 
40. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at 1 1. 
41. See Sarah H. Paoletti, Using the PeriodicReview to Advance Human Rights 
What Happens in Geneva Must Not Stay in Geneva, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE R. J. POVERTY 
L. & P. 268, 269 (2011). 
42. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at ¶ 3(f). 
43. Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/22 Annex 
VI (2008). 
44. See Human Rights Council Res. 16/21, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/21, Annex 
(Apr. 12, 2011). 
45. The HRC will decide on the measures it would need to take in case of persis-
tent non-cooperation by a State with the UPR. After Israel refused to participate in the 
second UPR cycle on the scheduled date, January 29, 2013, the HRC called upon Israel 
to resume its cooperation with the UPR mechanism and decided to reschedule the uni-
versal periodic review of Israel. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the HRC on its 7th 
org. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/OM/7/1 (Jan 29, 2013). Eventually, Israel agreed to par-
ticipate in the review. The date of consideration of Israel's report was postponed to 
October 29, 2013. 
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B. The two cycles of review of China 
China has undergone two review cycles in 2009 and 2013. The Work-
ing Group on the UPR held its fourth session from February 2-13, 2009, at 
Geneva. Rapporteurs from Canada, India, and Nigeria facilitated the first 
China review cycle4 6 and adopted an outcome document on May 29, 2009.47 
The HRC in its 11th session, 17th meeting, without a vote, adopted the 
outcome on China.48 In addition, according to the principle of trans-
parency, 49 the Working Group published China's views on conclusions and/ 
or recommendations, voluntary commitments, and its responses to issues 
that were not fully discussed during interactive dialogue with the Working 
Group prior to adoption of the outcome document by the HRC plenary.5 0 
China's second review took place during the Working Group's 17th 
meeting, from October 21 to November 1, 2013. The troika was comprised 
of rapporteurs from Poland, Sierra Leone, and the United Arab Emirates
51 
and prepared the second Working Group report.52 The HRC adopted the 
outcome without a vote at its 25th session, 41st meeting, on March 20, 
2014,53 and it published China's views on conclusions and/or recommenda-
tions, its voluntary commitments, and its responses to issues that were not 
5 4 
fully discussed during the interactive dialogue with the working group. 
46. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. On China, 1 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/1 1/25 (May 29, 2009). 
47. Id. 
48. See Human Rights Council Dec. 11/110, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/1 1/1 10, at 1 
(June 11, 2009). 
49. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, at ¶ 3(g). 
50. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the HRC, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 1/37, at ch. 
VI (Oct. 16, 2009). 
51. Id. 
52. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic 
Review - China, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5, at [ 4 (Dec. 4, 2013) [hereinafter HRC, UPR 
- China]; Human Rights Council, Rep. of Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic 
Review - China, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5/Corr. 1 (Dec. 26, 2013) [hereinafter HRC UPR 
- China, Corrigendum]. 
53. See Human Rights Council Dec., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/25/111, at I (Apr. 
16, 2014). 
54. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic 
Review - China, Add., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, at add. 1 (Feb. 27, 2014); 
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the HRC on its twenty-fifth session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
25/2, at ch. VI (July 17, 2014). 
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II. RECOMMENDING STATES' CONCENTRATION ON CHINA'S 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND ITS VARIATIONS 
A. Focus on Human Rights issues in two cycles of the review 
During the two cycles of review on China, unusually high numbers of 
countries actively participated in the interactive dialogue and with a high 
level of engagement. Compared with the first cycle, there was a remarkable 
increase in state participation in the second cycle, from 47 to 124 States. 
Additionally, the scope of issues widened slightly, from 39 to 41 issues. 
According to HRC statistics, China is among the countries that received the 
greatest number of recommendations.55 During the two review cycles, 171 
countries (45 developed countries and 126 developing countries) partici-
pated and proposed 422 recommendations. 56 The five most active partici-
pants were Germany, Australia, Czech Republic, Canada, and France.5 7 
France, Spain, Canada, Norway, and Mexico have been the five most vigor-
ous proponents in the UPR overall.5 8 The data indicates that developed 
countries in Western and Northern Europe are the principal recommenda-
tion proponents. In addition, developing countries have an increasing inter-
est in the UPR. For example, the number of developing countries 
participating in the review on China rose significantly, from 31 in the first 
cycle to 95 in the second cycle. 
During the interactive dialogue of the first UPR on China, implementa-
tion of international instruments was the most addressed issue, and the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) drew the most 
attention. Eighteen of 138 recommendations were pertinent to this issue. 
Australia, 59 Sweden,6 0 Algeria,61 Argentina, 62 Brazil63 and other countries 
all made recommendations involving this issue. In addition, recommending 
States primarily addressed detention, the death penalty, justice, civil and 
55. Cuba received 534 recommendations, Iran received 511 recommendations, 
Egypt received 492 recommendations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea re-
ceived 436 recommendations and Viet Nam received 428 recommendations. These five 
SuRs have received the most recommendations to date. UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
INFO (UPR INFO), STATISTICS OF RECOMMENDATIONS, https://www.upr-info.org/ 
database/statistics/ (last visited June 10, 2015). 
56. See id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 27. 
60. Id. at ¶ 92. 
61. Id. at ¶33. 
62. Id. at ¶ 84 
63. Id. at [ 95. 
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political rights, Special Procedures, the rights of minorities, and other issues 
of development, poverty, freedom of religion and belief, torture, and other 
CID treatment (see Figure 1). In the second cycle review of China, the main 
concerns of recommending States included international instruments, the 
death penalty, judicial justice, rights of the child, economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, freedom of religion and belief, rights of development, the right 
to education, and detention (see Figure 2). 
FIGURE 1: MAIN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST 
CYCLE OF REVIEW 
20 - 18 
16 
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cedures, minorities 
FIGURE 2: MAIN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE SECOND 
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Developed countries were more concerned about China's protection 
of civil and political rights, while developing countries focused on devel-
opment, rights of the child, and economic, social and cultural rights. For 
instance, recommendations from developed countries mainly related to 
international instruments (35 times), the death penalty (30 times), deten-
tion (23 times), civil and political rights (20 times), minorities (19 times), 
freedom of religion and belief (18 times), and freedom of opinion and 
expression (15 times). Recommendations from developing countries 
mainly focused on international instruments (39 times), civil and political 
rights (24 times), rights of the child (22 times), economic, social and cul-
tural rights (22 times), justice (17 times), poverty (17 times), women's 
rights (14 times), human rights education and training (14 times), rights to 
education (13 times), and the national plan of action (13 times).6 4 It ap-
pears that countries at different stages of development place different em-
phasis on human rights protection. Compared to developed countries, 
developing countries are more interested in the practice and experiences 
of China in the fields of development, poverty elimination, protection of 
the rights of the child, protection of women, and human rights education. 
Figure 3 illustrates that the ratification of ICCPR, rights of the child, 
detention, the death penalty, justice, and civil and political rights are 
among the top five concerns. 65 During both reviews, recommending states 
mostly focused on the civil and political rights aspect of China's human 
rights situation. China has not ratified the ICCPR,66 so this covenant is 
not an element of the review. However, China is a party to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention of the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, all of which deal with civil and politi-
cal rights to a varying extent. These conventions provide a crucial basis 
for recommending states to raise comments from the perspective of civil 
and political rights. 
64. Id.; see also A/HRC/25/5, supra note 52; A/HRC/25/5/Corr.1, supra note 52. 
65. The statistics for the international community are different. Statistics from 
UPR Info show that international instruments, rights of women and the child, torture, 
and justice are the top five issues attracting attention. See UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
INFO (UPR INFO), BEYOND PROMISES-THE IMPACT OF THE UPR ON THE GROUND 26 
(2014), www.upr-info.org./sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/2014_beyond 
promises.pdf. 
66. China signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1998, but has not ratified it. 
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B. Rate variationsof human rights issues in two cycles 
The attention to other human rights issues varied between the two re-
views. Rights of the child, the right to education, freedom of religion and 
belief, and economic, social, and cultural rights drew more attention in the 
second review. Many more countries offered recommendations on these is-
sues. Since a large number of countries participated in the review, the result 
indicates what the international community, in general, sees as China's ma-
jor human rights issues. 
The proportion of issues involved in the two cycles reflects the degree 
of interest in each issue. As shown in Figure 4, nine issues lost attention 
from the first review to the second. 
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Figure 4 shows a sharp decline from the first review to the second 
review in the percentage of recommendations on detention, Special Proce-
dures, and freedom of movement. Although recommending states were less 
concerned about the death penalty in the second cycle, interest remained 
high. There was very little decrease on the right to health. The rates of the 
recommendations related to NHRI and freedom of movement were not high 
in the first review and moved farther down in the second review. Minori-
ties, Special Procedures, torture and other CID treatment, and poverty drew 
much attention from the recommending states in the first review. However, 
these issues received little attention in the second review. One reason for 
this may be that China has achieved initial progress in some areas of human 
rights protection, and accordingly the focus of the international community 
changed. A case in point is that the HRC's Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food visited China upon invitation in December 2010,67 while in 2009 
China did not accept this kind of recommendation. Meanwhile, the Outline 
for Development-oriented Poverty Reduction for China's Rural Areas 
(2011-2020) has been implemented vigorously. In 2011, the Government 
raised the standard income ceiling for poverty relief to 2,300 yuan, covering 
122,380,000 recipients; by the end of 2012, the number of people covered 
under that standard had dropped to 98,990,000 persons, or 10.2 per cent of 
the rural population.6 8 
In the first review, five issues attracted little attention, including racial 
discrimination,6 9 human rights violations by state agents, 70 impunity,71 pub-
lic security, and extrajudicial executions. 72 All of these issues were men-
tioned just one time and were not raised again in the second cycle. In the 
second cycle, the following seven issues were discussed less: trafficking, 73 
asylum seeker-refugees, 74 HIV/AIDS, 7 5 sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity,76 elections,'7 7 right to housing,78 and right to water.7 9 Only eighteen rec-
67. See Human Rights Council, Nat'1 Rep. Submitted in Accordance with ¶ 5 of 
the Annex to HRC Res. 16/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/1, at ¶ 85. (Aug. 5, 
2013). 
68. Id. at ¶ 23. 
69. See A/HRC/25/5, supra note 52, at ¶59. 
70. Id. at ¶ 27(g). 
71. Id. at ¶ 82(g). 
72. Id. at ¶ 82(h). 
73. See A/HRC/25/5, supra note 52; A/HRC/25/5/Corr.1, supra note 52, at [[ 
186.96, 186.97, 186.98. 
74. See id. at 1[ 186.241, 186.242-243. 
75. See id. at 1[ 186.78, 186.80. 
76. See id. at ¶¶ 186.89, 186.80. 
77. See id. at 1[ 186.172-173. 
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ommendations out of 284 referred to these seven issues, and these issues 
were not discussed until the second review. This also reflected the interna-
tional community's attention to newly emerging issues in China's human 
rights protections, although these emerging issues are not currently princi-
pal problems in human rights protection in China. A particularly interesting 
aspect of this record is that, of the collectively fifty-four issues
80 cited in 
recommendations in all states' reviews, six major issues were not raised as 
to China: corruption, counter-terrorism, indigenous people, displaced per-
sons, right to food, and right to land. 
1II. ACTIONS REQUESTED By RECOMMENDATIONS 
Proposing recommendations by states to SuRs is the main aspect of the 
first stage of review. Therefore, the content of recommendations is crucial 
to evaluate the review. Categorizing recommendations according to the ac-
tions requested and then analyzing them facilitates observation of the rec-
ommendation's strength. The Action Category, developed by Professor 
Edward R. McMahon of the University of Vermont with the support of 
UPR Info, creates a new approach to look into the type of action requested 
by recommendations. 
The Action Category ranks recommendations on a scale from 1 to 5. 
First is minimal action, referring to recommendations directed at a non-
SuR, or calling upon the SuR to request technical assistance or share infor-
mation. Second is continuing action, meaning recommendations emphasiz-
ing continuity. Third is considering action, meaning recommendations to 
consider change. Fourth is general action, referring to recommendations of 
action that contain a general element. Fifth is specific action, meaning rec-
ommendations that request specific action.8 
1 
Table 1 reflects the Action Category distribution of recommendations 
for China and all states in two cycles. 
78. See id. at $1 186.196, 186.197. 
79. See id. at ¶ 186.195. 
80. See UPR INFO, supra note 65. 
81. See id. at ¶1 21-25. 
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TABLE 1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rank Action Category 
1 Specific action (5) 
2 General action (4) 
3 Continuing action (2) 
4 Considering action (3) 
5 Minimal action (1) 
TABLE 1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rank Action Category 
1 General action (4) 
2 Continuing action (2) 
3 Specific action (5) 
4 Considering action (3) 
5 Minimal action (1) 
TABLE 1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rank Action Category 
1 General action (4) 
2 Specific action (5) 
3 Continuing action (2) 
4 Considering action (3) 
5 Minimal action (1) 
TO CHINA IN THE FIRST CYCLE 






TO CHINA IN THE SECOND CYCLE 






TO CHINA OVER BOTH CYCLES 
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TABLE 1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO CHINA 
Comments by Comments by 
Action Category developed developing Total 
countries countries 
Minimal action (1) 0 0 10 100% 10 
Continuing action (2) 14 13% 90 87% 104 
Considering action (3) 6 19% 25 81% 31 
General action (4) 71 44% 89 56% 160 
Specific action (5) 83 71% 34 29% 117 
Total 174 41% 248 59% 422 
TABLE 1.5 RECOMMENDATIONS TO ALL STATES 8 2 
Rank (from 
Session Action Category Total Reco. % of 38292 Reco. 
1 to 20) 
1 General action (4) 16261 39.6% 
2 Specific action (5) 13772 33.54% 
3 Continuing action (2) 6981 17% 
4 Considering action (3) 3449 8.4% 
5 Minimal action (1) 603 1.47% 
Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 show that in the first and second reviews, the 
largest portion of recommendations to China, nearly forty percent, men-
tioned general action. 83 The portion of recommendations requiring specific 
82. UPR INFO, supra note 55. 
83. General actions mainly request China to take steps towards the ratification of 
ICCPR and its optional protocols; to strengthen human rights education with a view 
toward enhancing human rights awareness; to intensify legislation and the judicial pro-
tection system; to further guarantee the rights of life, education and health; etc. See A/ 
HRC/11/25, supra note 46; see also A/HRC/25/5, supra note 52; A/HRC/25/5/Corr.1, 
supra note 52. 
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action and continuing action was also relatively high.84 Minimal actions, 
namely recommendations requesting China to seek technical assistance and 
to share experiences and endeavors in developing its economy and improv-
ing its human rights situation, account for the smallest portion. This is simi-
lar to the overall breakdown of recommendations to all states shown in 
Table 1.5. According to this table, among recommendations to all states, 
recommendations demanding general actions account for the greatest num-
ber, followed by recommendations for specific actions. Recommendations 
asking for minimal action make up the smallest group. Recommendations 
falling into the general action category usually require SuRs to take perti-
nent measures, intensify endeavors in some areas, or speed up certain action 
to improve human rights. This kind of requirement is abstract or fuzzy and 
covers a wide range of actions. For SuRs, any action improving human 
rights will be easily attributed to this category and SuRs welcome this kind 
of recommendation. 
Recommending states must strike a balance between proposing recom-
mendations with political and diplomatic considerations so as not to harm 
their relationship with SuRs and maintaining their status as a supporter of 
human rights in the UPR. Thus, for recommending states, recommendations 
for general action will involve a relatively low demand and will avoid rejec-
tion by the SuR or risk straining the relationship with the recommending 
state. It is also more appropriate for recommending states to put forward 
general recommendations than specific recommendations if they are unfa-
miliar with the SuR's level of progress in human rights protection. 
Numerous recommendations were offered during the process, many of 
which were accepted by SuRs. The recommendations have different poten-
tial impacts on human rights. Classifying recommendations based on the 
type of actions requested provides a valuable approach to evaluating the 
quality of these recommendations. Recommendations belonging to catego-
ries 1-3 (Minimal Action, Continuing Action, and Considering Action) are 
usually easier to implement because they do not require costly action by the 
SuR. Category 4 (General Action) can also be comparatively easy to imple-
ment because the recommendations are so vague even minimal action can 
be perceived as an effort toward implementation. Meanwhile, it is difficult 
84. Specific actions include: To effectively implement and establish the necessary 
institutional mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of existing laws prohibiting torture 
and dismissing illegally obtained evidence; to set up a national institution in line with 
the Paris Principles; to enhance cooperation with the OHCHR by agreeing to outstand-
ing requests for visits to China and extending a standing invitation for future UN special 
procedures requests; and to create national and local-level systems to protect children 
from all forms of exploitation, including child labor. See id. 
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to assess implementation because category 4 recommendations do not indi-
cate how they should be implemented or what the tangible outcomes of 
implementation are. Category 5 (Specific Action) is often more difficult to 
implement because it requires precise action, but it is also easier to assess 
for that reason. In the context of the UPR, category 5 recommendations 
have the most potential to affect human rights because these recommenda-
tions leave the least amount of room for window-dressing.8 5 
Table 1.4 indicates developed countries have more vigorously engaged 
than developing countries during the review process on China, and a re-
markable difference exists between recommendations from developed 
countries and developing countries. On one hand, 59% of recommendations 
are raised by 126 developing countries (73.68%) and 41% of recommenda-
tions are issued by 45 developed countries (26.32%). On the other hand, 
developed countries prefer category 5 (83 recommendations) and category 4 
(71 recommendations), which account for 47.7% and 40.8% respectively of 
the total developed countries' proposals. In contrast, developing countries 
tend to raise recommendations that belong to category 2 (90 recommenda-
tions) and category 4 (89 recommendations), which account for 36% and 
35.8% respectively of the total developing countries' recommendations. 
Developed countries prefer to put forward precise and concrete recommen-
dations while developing countries prefer to offer general recommendations 
as to China's human rights situation, with the hope China continues to assist 
them with economic and social development. This confirms Edward R. Mc-
Mahon's earlier conclusions: namely, overall, Asian and African countries 
prefer to come up with recommendations that fall into category 2 (Continu-
ing Action) and category 4 (General Action) while European countries pre-
fer to bring forward recommendations in category 3 (Considering Action) 
and category 5 (Specific Action).8 6 
Table 1.1 and 1.2 also show in the second China review there was a 
rapid increase of the proportion of general category and continuing category 
recommendations and a remarkable decline of specific category recommen-
dations. Generally, the reduction of specific category action has become a 
noticeable negative phenomenon in the UPR mechanism.87 The proportion 
of category 5 has declined from 34.4% in the first cycle to 32.5% in the 
second cycle.88 This high rate of general recommendations is explained by 
the fact that states face diplomatic or other constraints in making precise 
85. See UPR INFO, supra note 65, at ¶ 20. 
86. See Mcmahon & Ascherio, supra note 31, at 238. 
87. UPR INFO, A YEAR AT THE UPR: AN ANALYSIS OF 2014, www.upr-info.org./ 
en/news/year-at-the-upr-analysis-of-2 01 4 (last visited June 12, 2015). 
88. See UPR INFO, supra note 55. 
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recommendations. 89 In March, 2014, nineteen Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) denounced recommendations in the second cycle for being less spe-
cific, noting the overall number of recommendations made has increased, 
but the quality has decreased. 90 The 2014 UPR annual report set the annual 
goals to ensure stronger recommendations at the UPR and to draw the atten-
tion of the HRC to the lack of specific recommendations. It notably called 
on states to improve the quality and specificity of UPR recommendations. 91 
The decline in quality of recommendations has harmed the efficiency 
of recommendation implementation and human rights improvement in 
SuRs. UPR Info classified the implementation situation into four groups: 
fully implemented, partially implemented, not implemented, and not as-
sessed.92 Out of 11,527 commented recommendations from 165 States 
evaluated by UPR Info, the percentage of full implementation declined 
from category 1 to category 5. The percentage of non-implementation in-
creased, from category 1 to 5, with the exception of category 3 (Consider-
ing action). 93 As demonstrated above, the less action a recommendation 
demands, the more likely it is to be fully implemented, and this does not 
necessarily translate to human rights progress. Category 5 has the greatest 
potential to result in concrete progress in human rights,94 and the implemen-
tation percentage is not promising. Over time, a negative response to spe-
cific category recommendations by SuRs may in turn reduce recommending 
states' enthusiasm for submitting high quality recommendations and ulti-
mately detract from the substantive effect of the UPR. 
V. CHINA'S RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS 
"Unlike Council sessions, which are widely reported in and where tak-
ing a stance may further a state's reputation, the UPR sessions are less scru-
tinized and therefore criticisms earn little reward but carry a large risk to a 
state's foreign affairs." 95 Because of diplomatic concerns, recommending 
states may equivocate rather than raise precise recommendations. However, 
recommendations that include specific action requirements can be ex-
tremely helpful to encourage SuRs to take substantive actions. One of the 
89. See UPR INFO, supra note 65, at N 20-21. 
90. UPR INFO, supra note 88. 
91. UPR INFO, UPR Info annual report in 2014, (2015), www.upr-info.org./sites/ 
default/files/general-document/pdf/upr infoannual-report_2014.pdf. 
92. See UPR INFO, supra note 65, at 1 21. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at ¶ 20. 
95. ROSA FREEDMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: A CRI-
TIQUE AND EARLY ASSESSMENT 271 (2013); see also Smith, supra note 20. 
2016-2017] QuantitativeAnalysis of UPR on China 21 
challenges confronting SuRs as well as other stakeholders is that some rec-
ommendations are equivocal and abstract or even deviate from reality, mak-
ing them hard to implement. Consequently, such recommendations are 
ineffective in improving human rights in the SuRs. Thus, it is most useful to 
study the human rights situation of the SuRs through multiple valid chan-
nels, and then to make recommendations that are SMART (Specific, Mea-
surable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound). 96 In this way, the SuR is 
more likely to voluntarily commit to recommendations or accept and actu-
ally implement pertinent recommendations, thereby achieving true human 
rights improvements in the SuRs. 
SuRs' responses to recommendations were categorized with the fol-
lowing terms: (1) accepted, (2) rejected, (3) general response, and (4) no 
response.97 In conformity with paragraph 32 of HRC Resolution 5/198 and 
according to new HRC practice, the UPR Info modified its classification of 
recommendations and now uses only two types of responses: accepted and 
noted.99 
96. See UPR INFO, supra note 65, at 1 61. 
97. See UPR INFO, supra note 35, at ¶ 2.4. 
98. "Recommendations that enjoy the support of the State concerned will be iden-
tified as such [accepted]. Other recommendations, together with the comments of the 
State concerned thereon, will be noted." BROWNLIE'S DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
24 (Sir Ian Brownlie, CBE, QC & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill eds., 2010). 
99. See UPR INFO, supra note 65, at ¶ 13. 
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A. Proportionsand categories of accepted recommendations by China 
FIGURE 5: PROPORTION OF ACCEPTED AND NOTED 
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As Figure 5 demonstrates, the proportion of accepted recommenda-
tions increased considerably, from 40% in the first review to 72% in the 
second review. The increase indicates China became more enthusiastic in 
engaging in this mechanism and more willing to embrace reasonable and 
constructive recommendations. Overall, across the two reviews, the average 
percentage of China's accepted recommendations is 61.37%: 259 recom-
mendations were accepted out of a total of 422. For reference, the rate of 
accepted recommendations is 75% for Norway,10' 65% for the United 
States,102 64.85% for Japan, 103 46.15% for Netherlands'0 4 and 30.5% for 
India. 0 5 Three states, Jordan, Paraguay, and Somalia, accepted all the rec-
100. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46; see also A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 
54. 
101. See id. Over two cycles, Norway received a total of 320 recommendations 
and accepted 241 of them. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (Norway as SuR). 
102. In the first cycle, the Unites States received 280 recommendations and ac-
cepted 183 of them. See UPR INFo, supra note 55 (United States as SuR). 
103. See id. Over two cycles, Japan received a total of 239 recommendations and 
accepted 155 of them. See UPR INFo, supra note 55 (Japan as SuR). 
104. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (United States as SuR). Over two cycles, 
Netherlands received a total of 182 recommendations and accepted 84 of them. See 
UPR INFO, supra note 55 (Netherlands as SuR). 
105. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (United States as SuR). Over two cycles, India 
received a total of 200 recommendations and accepted 61 of them. See UPR INFO, supra 
note 55 (India as SuR). 
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ommendations they received and sixteen states accepted less than 50% of 
the recommendations. 10 6 In the UPR in the overall international community 
from sessions 1 through 20, 30,472 out of 41,066 total recommendations 
were accepted-a 74.2% acceptance rate. 0 7 The rate of accepted recom-
mendations by China and some developed countries were lower than the 
average. Some scholars believe the high overall acceptance rate suggests 
the political nature of the process in that many states seek to issue recom-
mendations the SuRs can accept, and SuRs generally wish to be seen as 
accepting most recommendations. 0 8 
Table 2 presents the rate of accepted and noted recommendations in 
each category, by China and by the international community. Table 2.1 in-
dicates most of China's accepted recommendations belong to the second 
and fourth category. Among the 259 accepted recommendations, recom-
mendations in category 2 and 4 account for 81% of the total sum, while 
those in category 3 and 5 account for the lowest rate of acceptance, only 
6.9% and 8.1% respectively. Moreover, among 163 noted recommenda-
tions, 59% of them belong to category 5. Table 2.2 shows that in the inter-
national community, recommendations in categories 1 and 4 make up 67% 
of the accepted recommendations, and recommendations in category 5 ac-
count for 59% of the noted recommendations.' 09 Similarly, for China, the 
plurality of accepted recommendations are those in category 4 while the 
majority of noted recommendations are those in category 5. 
106. The acceptance proportion is 48.3% for Bahamas, 45.6% for Brunei Darus-
salam, 26.1% for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 45.8% for Eritrea, 49.7% 
for Gambia, 30.5% for India, 14.1% for Israel, 49.1% for Malaysia, 35.6% for Malta, 
39% for Myanmar, 46.15% for Netherlands, 46.8% for South Korea, 38.9% for St Kitts 
& Nevis, 48.7% for St Vincent & the Grenadines, 40.6% for Trinidad & Tobago, and 
12.1% for South Sudan. See UPR INFO, supra note 55. 
107. See id. 
108. See McMahon & Ascherio, supra note 31, at 240. 
109. See UPR INFO, supra note 55. 
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TABLE 2.1: RATE OF ACCEPTED AND NOTED RECOMMENDATIONS BY 
CATEGORY IN CHINA 
Categories Accepted Noted 
Minimal action (1) 10 3.9% 0 0% 
Continuing action (2) 101 39% 3 1.8% 
Considering action (3) 18 6.9% 13 8% 
General action (4) 109 42.1% 51 31.2% 
Specific action (5) 21 8.1% 96 59% 
Total 259 100% 163 100% 
TABLE 2.2: RATE OF ACCEPTED AND NOTED RECOMMENDATIONS BY 
CATEGORY FROM SESSIONS 1 TO 20' o 
Categories Accepted Noted 
Minimal action (1) 579 2% 24 0.2% 
Continuing action (2) 6671 22% 310 3% 
Considering action (3) 1979 6% 1470 13.8% 
General action (4) 13698 45% 2562 24% 
Specific action (5) 7545 25% 7227 59% 
Total 30472 100% 10593 100% 
Table 3 shows China's different acceptance rates for each category. 
Recommendations in category 1 and category 2 are almost always accepted, 
while 58% of recommendations in category 3, and 68% of those in category 
4 are accepted. Only 18% of recommendations in category 5 are accepted. 
In contrast, from sessions 1 to 20 for the international community, 96.02% 
of recommendations in category 1; 95.56% of category 2; 57.38% of cate-
gory 3; 84.24% of category 4; and 54.79% of category 5 were accepted."' 
The two groups of data show the lowest rate of acceptance is in category 5, 
both for China and for other countries. However, China's rate of acceptance 
110. See UPR INFo, supra note 55 (China as SuR). 
I1. See UPR INFo, supra note 55. 
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in categories 4 and 5 is far lower than the average acceptance rate by the 
international community. 
Interestingly, category 3 recommendations, which do not require states 
actually to take any actions, find fewer acceptances than category 4 recom-
mendations, which call for actions to be taken. Edward R. McMahon sug-
gests the rationale for this is due to the nature and context of the 
recommendations included in this category. He believes, "Analysis of the 
category 3 recommendations reveals that many of them contravene deeply 
held beliefs or policy positions of the governments, and possibly also the 
populations involved. These types of recommendations are hyper-sensitive 
to many governments, making it radioactive for the SuR to even think about 
adopting the reforms, especially as they could subsequently be called upon 
to present the results of their considerations. By contrast, category 4 recom-
mendations, by virtue of their lack of specificity, can often prove to be low-
hanging fruit for a SuR to pick."l1 2 
TABLE 3: RATE OF ACCEPTED AND NOTED RECOMMENDATIONS 
WITHIN CATEGORIES BY CHINAl
13 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5 
Minimal Continuing Considering General Specific 
action action action action action 
10 101 18 109 21 
Accepted (100%) (97.1%) (58%) (68%) (18%) 
9613 51Noted 0 3 
(0%) (2.9%) (42%) (32%) (82%) 
Total 10 104 31 160 117 
B. China's acceptance, rejection and responses to recommendations 
1. China's acceptance of recommendations and its variations 
Recommendations China accepted in both reviews covered a wide 
range of topics. These included: (1) creating conditions for an early ICCPR 
ratification; 1 4 (2) continuing to implement the policy of strictly controlling 
112. See McMahon, supra note 31, at 370-72. 
113. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (China as the SuR). 
114. See A/HRC/1 1/25, supra note 46, at I 114.1; see also A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, 
supra note 54, at [[ 186.3-186.10. 
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and applying the death penalty;" 5 (3) continuing its constructive and coop-
erative dialogue with the UN human rights system and human rights treaty 
bodies;"'6 (4) strengthening human rights education and trainings and 
human rights awareness campaigns;" 7 (5) attaching importance to and en-
hancing the rights of vulnerable persons like women, children and disabled 
persons;" 8 (6) strengthening its efforts in poverty alleviation and bridging 
the gap in economic and social development between rural and urban areas 
and among regions;1 19 (7) continuing its endeavor to build a sound social 
security system and health care facilities for its people;1 20 (8) strengthening 
international cooperation with other countries, sharing its experiences and 
best practices in the field of poverty reducing;121 (9) improving standards of 
living in other developing countries;1 22 (10) providing protection to citizens' 
economic, social, and cultural rights;1 23 (11) adopting measures to ensure 
access to health and job opportunities;1 24 (12) continuing legal and judicial 
efforts to promote and protect human rights;12 5 (13) and protecting the legit-
imate rights and interests of ethnic minorities.1 26 
Legislative and policy changes in China's domestic human rights pro-
tections directly led to its accepting some of the recommendations in the 
second review that were not accepted in the first review. These recommen-
115. See A/HRC/1.1/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 114.30; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra 
note 54, at ¶¶ 186.110-186.111. 
116. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 114.9-11; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra 
note 54, at i 186.63, 186.65, 186.69, 186.71, 186.73. 
117. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at 1 114.7; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, at [[ 
186.40-41, 186.44, 186.47. 
118. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at 1 114.13-15, 114.20; A/HRC/25/5/ 
Add.1, supra note 54, at [[ 186.74-186.78, 186.80-81, 186.84. 
119. See AIHRC/11/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 114.19, 114.27; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, 
supra note 54, at I 186.188, 186.190, 186.192-193. 
120. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at 1[114.20, 114.21 and U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 54, at 11 186.186-186.188. 
121. See A/HRC/11/25, supranote 46, at 1[ 114.28, 114.29, 114.42; A/HRC/25/5/ 
Add.1, supra note 54, at 1 186.250. 
122. See A/HRC/11/25, supranote 46, at l[114.28, 114.40, 114.41; A/HRC/25/5/ 
Add.1, supra note 54, at ¶ 186.252. 
123. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 114.24; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra 
note 54, at ¶ 186.185. 
124. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at ¶ 114.16-17; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra 
note 54, at ¶[ 186.176, 186. 178-179, 186.206-186.217. 
125. See A/HRC/11/25, supranote 46, at ¶ 114.2; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supranote 
54, at ¶ 186.50, 186.53. 
126. See A/HRC/11/25, supra note 46, at¶¶ 114.16, 114.20; A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, 
supra note 54, at [ 186.84. 
27 2016-2017] QuantitativeAnalysis of UPR on China 
dations were: (1) ensuring any reformed prison or compulsory care system 
meets international human rights standards;1 2 7 (2) abolishing the system of 
re-education through labor; 1 2 8 (3) taking effective measures to ensure law-
yers can defend their clients without fear of harassment, and practice their 
profession freely;1 2 9 and (4) ensuring judicial independence, and that judi-
cial authorities exercise their powers in accordance with the law.o30 This 
shows China does not completely reject recommendations issued by the 
international community. China's responses are based on its objective ac-
knowledgement he above problems exist, and on pragmatic concerns about 
its domestic political, economic, and social development. This represents an 
effort made by the Chinese government beyond voluntary promises. 
2. China's rejection of recommendations and its responses 
China did not accept some recommendations involving specific re-
quested actions due to the current political, economic and social situation in 
China. Those recommendations are: 
(1) Setting out a timetable for implementing recommendations: For 
example, China is now prudently carrying out positive prepara-
tions but unable to set a specific timetable for the ratification of 
the ICCPR.131 China rejected recommendations from Norway, 
Portugal, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, to ratify the 
ICCPR as soon as possible. 132 
(2) Ratifying some core international human rights conventions: 
China rejected Tunisia's recommendation requesting China to 
ratify the International Convention on the Protection of All Per-
sons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), 133 and rejected 
Namibia's recommendation that China ratify outstanding core 
human rights instruments, including the ICCPR, although it is-
sued this recommendation without a timetable requirement.1 34 
127. See A/HRC/1 1/25, supranote 46, at ¶ 92(d); A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 
54, at ¶ 186.118. 
128. See A/HRC/1.1/25, supra note 46, at I 28(d), 82(e); A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, 
supra note 54, at ¶¶ 186.117, 186.118. 
129. See A/HRC/ 11/25, supra note 46, at ¶79(a); A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 
54, at ¶¶ 186.129, 186.131. 
130. See A/HRC/1 1/25, supra note 46, at I 82(d); A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supranote 
54, at ¶ 186.125. 
131. See U.N. Doc. AIHRC/25/5/ Add.1, supra note 54, at ¶ 186.1 (China's 
position). 
132. See id. at ¶¶ 186.11-13,15. 
133. See id. at ¶ 186.16. 
134. See id. at [ 186.21. 
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(3) Demanding China accept individual complaint procedures and 
investigation mechanisms based on visits to the state party: China 
rejected recommendations raised by Benin, Estonia, Portugal, 
and Albania, which would require China to ratify optional proto-
cols on the individual complaint procedure.1 35 In addition, China 
rejected Tunisia's recommendation on ratifying the Optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention against Torture (CAT), which provides 
for an investigation mechanism that includes visits to States 
Parties. 136 
(4) Reforming China's political institutions: For example, China re-
jected the recommendations by New Zealand and Tunisia to es-
tablish a NHRI. China insisted "it has not established a NHRI in 
terms of Paris Principles, however, many government agencies in 
China assume and share similar responsibilities. The issue of es-
tablishing a NHRI falls into China's sovereignty, and should be 
considered in a holistic manner in accordance with its national 
conditions." 137 
(5) Handling sensitive diplomatic issues: China rejected Canada's 
recommendation on inviting the UN Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to 
visit North-Eastern China to meet officials and North Korean cit-
izens who have fled to China.138 
(6) Extending a standing invitation to special procedures mandate 
holders: While China agreed to cooperate with a special proce-
dures recommendation issued by France, it refused to issue a 
standing invitation for mandate holders, and to accept all re-
quested visits by them, as Hungary recommended. 139 
(7) Abolishing the death penalty: In response to the recommenda-
tions to abolish the death penalty by New Zealand, Australia, and 
Portugal, China emphasized its position to retain the death pen-
alty, but promised it would strictly and prudently limit its appli-
cation according to law. China insisted it "has been making legal 
and systematic efforts to gradually reduce the application of 
death penalty." 4 0 
(8) Protecting ethnic minorities' rights: China pointed out the non-
objectivity of recommendations regarding to the protection of 
135. See id. at 1 186.17-19. 
136. See id. at ¶ 186.16. 
137. See id. at ¶ 186.59. 
138. See id. at¶ 186.66. 
139. See id. at¶¶ 186.70-71. 
140. See id. at 186.17. 
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ethnic minorities' rights, raised by Australia, Sweden, German, 
and Czech Republic, and rejected them.14 ' 
C. Implementation of recommendations by China:follow-up 
As previously stated, the UPR mechanism is a three-stage process. The 
second stage, following-up, is of great significance and is the backbone to 
realizing the UPR's goals. The follow-up phrase should focus on imple-
menting accepted recommendations and developing human rights in 
SuRs. 14 2 Because the review interval is long and some recommendations 
can be implemented immediately, UPR Info created an update process to 
re-evaluate the human rights situation two years after the UPR examination. 
UPR Info especially invites states, NGOs, and NHRIs to share their com-
ments on the implementation (or the lack thereof) of recommendations 
adopted at the HRC. UPR Info also publishes a Mid-term Implementation 
Assessment (MIA) for this purpose.1 43 
1. China's implementation of the first review recommendations 
According to the China's MIA conducted by UPR Info, 71 recommen-
dations (5 1%) were not implemented, 19 recommendations (14%) were par-
tially implemented, 4 recommendations (3%) were fully implemented, and 
no answer was received for 44 (32%) out of 138 recommendations in the 
first cycle of review. 144 The above data show 17% of first cycle recommen-
dations triggered practical actions in China's MIA, which demonstrates 
that, to some extent, the scale of implemented recommendations in China 
can still be increased. However, a positive aspect of the record is, ulti-
mately, China fully implemented all three out of four recommendations 
concerning the death penalty that were not accepted in the first review.1 
45 
Not only that, the overwhelming majority of partially implemented recom-
mendations in China's MIA also had been rejected in the first review cycle 
by China, including recommendations pertinent to the death penalty,1 
46 
strengthening cooperation with special procedures, 147 and extending stand-
141. See id. at 1 186.225, 230, 232-33. 
142. See HRC Res. 16/21, supra note 44, at Annex?C § 6. 
143. UPR INFO, THE FOLLOW-UP PROGRAMME ON CHINA (Feb 13, 2012), 
www.upr-info.org/followup/index/country/china. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at ¶[ 12, 14, 57; A/HRC/1 1/25, supra note 46. 
146. UPR INFO, supra note 143, at [¶ 12, 13, 24, 34, 37, 40, 57. 
147. Id. at [[ 18, 25,41. 
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ing invitations. 1 48 For instance, at first, China did not accept the two first 
cycle recommendations requiring it to limit death penalty applicability. 
However, two years after the first cycle review, the Chinese government 
abolished the death penalty for thirteen economic crimes.1 4 9 The data indi-
cate rejected recommendations are not necessarily more difficult to imple-
ment than accepted ones. States may decide to implement recommendations 
in accordance with to their own changing circumstances. 
2. Comparison of implementation status between China and the 
international community 
Of 11,527 recommendations examined by UPR Info in MIA for the 
165 countries in the first cycle (HRC sessions 2 through 12), 2,068 recom-
mendations (18%) were fully implemented at mid-term, 3,428 recommen-
dations (30%) were partially implemented at mid-term, and 5,602 
recommendations (48%) were not implemented at mid-term. For the re-
maining 429 recommendations (4%), the information provided by the stake-
holders was not sufficient for determining implementation status.15 0 As to 
overall implementation of the first cycle, almost half the recommendations 
were either fully or partially implemented, and the other half not imple-
mented by mid-term. 
In terms of statistics at the mid-term of implementing recommenda-
tions after the first cycle of review, the international community was ahead 
of China. The comparison is not simple, however, in that the vast majority 
of China's fully or partially implemented recommendations had not been 
accepted during the review process, while the recommendations imple-
mented by other countries overall were those that had been accepted by the 
SuRs; only 5% were not accepted recommendations.1 5 ' Therefore, China's 
implementation of recommendations that were not accepted indicates more 
flexibility in meeting the recommendations than was expected. Taking an 
optimistic view of the UPR, states may take additional action to implement 
recommendations in the latter half of the review cycle. Additionally, UPR 
Info noted, "a substantial part of the information upon which the analysis 
relies was provided by CSOs, who tend to be more critical of the govern-
148. Id. at ¶ 77. 
149. See l (/L) [Amendment (VIII) to the Criminal 
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by National People's Congress 
Standing Committee, Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011; UPR INFo, supra note 65. 
150. See UPR INFo, supra note 65, at ¶ 17. 
151. See id. at ¶ 33. 
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ment's human rights record. Thus, the final percentage of implementation 
may be even more promising for the future of the UPR."15 
2 
VI. IDEALITY AND REALITY: UPR AND CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT 
China's attitude towards human rights has changed a great deal since it 
adopted its reform policy: "China's human rights diplomacy has been 
morphing from a reactive, defensive, sovereignty-based, and inward-look-
ing approach into an ever active, expansive, system-focused and revisionist 
agenda." 53 China's attitude towards international human rights mechanisms 
and norms has gradually become a subject of research by many scholars. 
15 4 
Ann Kent believes China's membership in international human rights insti-
tutions demonstrates its international socialization. Kent believes China has 
gradually begun to accept basic international human rights procedures and 
norms in multilateral forums.1 5 Andrew Nathan argues, "China will be a 
taker, not a shaper, of emerging world norms and institutions in the rights 
field." 156 In contrast, Kent insists China plays a multifaceted role in interna-
tional human rights mechanisms. She believes in some cases-such as 
when it engaged in the UN Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Com-
mission-China was "the taker, shaper and even the breaker of norms."
157 
Katrin Kinzelbach quantitatively analyzed China's positions and statements 
in the UN and concluded "Beijing accepts, by and large, the normative 
frame provided by international human rights, but it rejects many of its 
implications."1 5 8 After analyzing China's rise and its influence on UPR, 
Bjorn Ahl found "the fact that China faces less direct criticism enables it to 
152. See id. at 9 17-18. 
153. Titus C. Chen, China's IncreasingImportantRole in Global Human Rights 
Regimes, APSA Annual Meeting Paper 46 (2010). 
154. See, e.g., Ann Kent, China and the InternationalHuman Rights Regime: A 
Case Study of MultilateralMonitoring, 1989-1994, 17 Hum. RTS. Q. 1 (1995); James V. 
Feinerman, Chinese Participationin the InternationalLegal Order:Rogue Eleohantor 
Team Player? 141 CHINA Q. 189 (1995); Wei-Chin Lee, With Open Arms? Chinaand 
Human Rights in United Nations, 2 PACIFICA 16 (1990); Sophia Woodman, Human 
Rights as "ForeignAffairs": China'sReporting UnderHuman Rights Treaties, 35 H.K. 
L. J. 179 (2005). 
155. See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIM-
ITS OF COMPLIANCE 240-44, 247 (1999). 
156. Andrew J. Nathan, Human Rights in China'sForeign Policy, 139 CHINA Q. 
643, 643 (1994). 
157. See KENT, supra note 155, at 244. 
158. Katrin Kinzelbach, Will China's Rise Lead to a New Normative Order?An 
Analysis of China's Statements on Human Rights at the United Nations (2000-2010), 
30 NETH. Q. OF Hum. RTS. 299, 331 (2012) 
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build a coherent counter-discourse as a basis of challenging international 
human rights norms."159 China's engagement in two cycles of the UPR now 
provides a new window into its relationship with international human rights 
mechanisms. 
A. Active support and engagement of China in the review process 
Experience shows China's attitude towards the UPR might be more 
active than some detractors expected. As a SuR, the Chinese government 
actively organized multiple departments to prepare the National Report 6 0 
and submitted it in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to HRC Reso-
lution 16/21. During China's review, other states comprehensively ex-
amined human rights in China and raised wide-ranging issues and 
recommendations. The Chinese government has sent high-level and cross-
department delegations to participatel61 to ensure immediate responses to 
159. See Ahl, supra note 10, at 660. 
160. To compile the second cycle's report, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
took the lead in setting up a special task force comprising representatives of nearly 30 
legislative, judicial, and administrative organs of the national government. The Ministry 
also solicited the oral and written opinions of nearly 20 non-governmental organizations 
and academic institutions. See Nat'l Rep. Submitted in Accordance with [5 of the An-
nex to HRC Res. 16/21, China, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/1 (Aug 5, 2013). 
161. In the first cycle, the delegation of China was headed by H.E. Mr. Li 
Baodong, Representative, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of China to the 
United Nations Office at Geneva and composed of 42 members from Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, The United 
Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee, Political and Law Commission of 
CPC Central Committee, Commission of Legislative Affairs of the Standing Committee 
of NPC, Ministry of Education, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Minis-
try of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of Health, State Administration 
for Religious Affairs, State Council Information Office, State Bureau for Letters and 
Calls of Complaint, State Council Commission on Affairs of Disabled People, Perma-
nent Mission of China to the UNOG, the MSAR Government, and the HKSAR Govern-
ment. See above n.46. 
In the second cycle, the delegation of China was headed by H. E. Mr. Wu Hailong, 
Special Envoy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, and composed of 44 members 
from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, The United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee, Political 
and Law Commission of CPC Central Committee, Commission of Legislative Affairs 
of the Standing Committee of NPC, Ministry of Education, State Ethnic Affairs Com-
mission, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of 
Health, State Administration for Religious Affairs, State Council Information Office, 
State Bureau for Letters and Calls of Complaint, State Council Commission on Affairs 
33 2016-2017] QuantitativeAnalysis of UPR on China 
comments and questions raised in the review.1 62 The Chinese delegation 
even positively responded to critical statements, thus indicating the effec-
tiveness of constructive dialogue. 
In the two UPR cycles, China vigorously engaged in reviews of other 
states as a recommending state. As of August 31, 2015, China offered 239 
recommendations to 143 states, which covered the full range of human 
rights while primarily focusing on development, poverty, and women's 
rights.1 63 These are areas of great significance to China, and the country has 
made remarkable progress on these issues. The practice that China's recom-
mendation mainly focuses on is those areas where China has the compara-
tive advantage in its domestic experience corresponds to the goal of the 
UPR mechanism, namely, "the sharing of best practice among states and 
other stakeholders." 64 Based on this record, some scholars argue, "when all 
comments made by all states are rated positive and negative, to the same 
criteria, China is the most positive Asian participant and, indeed, one of the 
most positive of all states participating in the review process."l 
65 
A major reason for China to actively support and participate in the 
UPR is China identifies with its fundamental principles and values. China 
opposed the Commission on Human Rights' review style, which was char-
acterized by confrontation and "naming and shaming." 66 During the em-
bryonic stage of the HRC, China exerted great effort in building UPR's 
capacity and shaping its norms. As Rhona Smith notes, "China led the Like 
Minded Groupl 67 who were against singling out any states for criticism or 
comment within the new Council." 168 The UPR, applying equally to all 
of Disabled People, State Council Commission on Affairs of Disabled People, Perma-
nent Mission of China to the UNOG, the MSAR Government, and the HKSAR Govern-
ment. See also U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5, supra note 52. 
162. See Rhona K.M. Smith, Equality of 'Nations Large and Small': Testing the 
Theory of the Universal PeriodicReview in the Asian-Pacific, 12 ASIA-PACIFIC J. ON 
Hum. RTs. & L. 36, 50 (2011). 
163. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (China as SuR). 
164. H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4. 
165. Smith, supra note 8, at 108. 
166. Redondo (2008), supra note 23, at 722-23. 
167. The 'Like Minded Group of Developing Countries' (LMDC) is a group of 
developing countries who organize themselves as a block negotiator in international 
organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization; they re-
present more than 50% of the world's population. According to a statement by the 
Chinese diplomat Sha Zukang in 2005, the member countries of the Like Minded Group 
are Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe. Smith, supra note 8. 
168. See Smith, supra note 8, at 87. 
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states, matches the anti-selectivity stance advocated by the Like Minded 
Group, which influenced the formative stages of the HRC.1 69 Some of the 
terms that reflect China's position have been successfully incorporated into 
the principles of the UPR, such as "cooperation," "interactive dialogue," 
"non-selective," "non-confrontational," and "non-politicized." 70 Therefore, 
China ran for HRC membership three times: in 2006, 2009, and 2013, and 
made a promise to the international community on the campaign trail to 
support the UPR's work. 171 As both a recommending state and a SuR, 
China participated in the review activities in accordance with the procedural 
rules of UPR. Together, these actions constitute a concrete effort by China 
to integrate into the international human rights mechanism as both an influ-
ence shaper and taker. 
B. "Implicit politicization"in the UPR 
Statistics show general action category recommendations accounted 
for most of the recommendations to both China and the international com-
munity. When China participated in reviews of other states, very few of its 
recommendations required the SuRs to take positive actions. Only 27 of the 
239 recommendations China issued belong to category 5-requesting spe-
cific actions.1 72 Meanwhile, both China and the international community are 
willing to accept general recommendations lacked a precise action require-
ment. States' tendency to propose recommendations that lack substantial 
content and are easy for the SuRs to accept has become common. 
Many observers have sharply criticized this trend and recognize the 
existence of ritualism in the UPR. Ritualism can be defined as "acceptance 
of institutionalized means for securing regulatory goals while losing all fo-
cus in achieving the goals or outcomes themselves."1 7 3 Walter Kilin argues: 
elements of ritualism were already apparent during the first cycle ... 
participated without the intention of accepting any recommendations; 
or accepted most or even all recommendations without being willing 
169. Statement by H.E. Ambassador SHA Zukang, on behalf of the Like Minded 
Group, at the Meeting between the President of the General Assembly and the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, Nov. 25, 2005. See also Smith, supra note 8, at 89. 
170. See H.R.C., supra note 4. 
171. Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, Letter addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/68/90 (June 5, 2013). 
172. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (China as SuR). 
173. Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Introduction: The Regulatory Power 
of the Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC 
REVIEw: RITUALS AND RITUALISM10 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 
2014). 
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to implement them effectively . . . peers made recommendations 
which were not based on an analysis of the human rights situation in 
the relevant state, or made recommendations that were too general, 
and largely devoid of content, or which served as a vehicle to praise 
74
friendly countries with problematic human rights records." 
Ritualism detracts from the overall quality of recommendations in many 
ways and cannot substantially improve the human rights situations in the 
SuRs. 
Recommending states tend to issue comments with vague content for a 
variety of reasons. First, for the SuR, it is not pleasant to be subjected to 
other states' recommendations on an international public platform. The ex-
ercise shatters the human rights image each SuR crafts in its National Re-
port. Recommending states cannot help but consider whether their 
relationships with the SuR will be damaged. Second, each country faces its 
own human rights problems. Therefore, recommending states will inevita-
bly worry about whether it will be subjected to "equivalent retaliation" 
when offering unfavorable recommendations to the SuR. Third, each SuR 
assumes the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights in 
its own country, and its human rights situation, good or bad, has no direct 
relationship with other countries' interests. There are neither legal rewards 
nor obligations for recommending states to issue recommendations practical 
enough for the SuR. Fourth, "allied states are clearly free to work together 
on either a concerted campaign of 'gotcha' aimed at one state or another, or 
as a mutual praise society to assist each other's review."
1 7 5 Allehone 
Mulugeta Abebe even suggests the UPR is just like a political market for 
bargaining and "[g]roups never issue statements that are critical of one of 
their own. In fact, states belonging to similar regional groupings often make 
statements praising the human rights situation in the state under review."
1 7 6 
HRC Resolution 5/1 stressed the review should be conducted in a 
"non-politicized"' 77 manner. However, the reality is this principle has not 
been complied with well. The HRC is formally opposed to the infiltration of 
politics during the review, but politics often shadow this process and exert 
explicit or implicit influences on the review. Rosa Freedman believes the 
"UPR has the potential to become further politicized in a number of 
174. Walter Kalin, Ritual and Ritualism at the Universal PeriodicReview: A Pre-
liminary Proposal,in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEw: RITUALS 
AND RITUALISM 40 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014). 
175. See Harrington,supra note 13, at 88. 
176. See Abebe, supra note 19, at 19. 
177. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 4, ¶ 3(g). 
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ways."17 8 Rhona Smith argues "the review process is by necessity selective 
with the selection of issues depending on the interest and concerns of the 
commenting states."'79 "The use of multiple positive statements, often fill-
ing the allocated time, undermine[s] the review's ability to improve human 
rights situations within reviewed states." 80 From the NGO perspective, 
states offer recommendations selectively based on political considera-
tions.1 8' In this regard, the pessimists have thought, "this 'politicization' has 
seemed more pronounced than ever. In several instances information pro-
vided by SuRs, or by those praising them, has been misleading at best." 82 
This concern may seem extreme, but it is not without merit. Many states do 
not precisely understand the meaning of constructive dialogue. Instead, they 
regard their engagement in the UPR as multilateral diplomatic activity. 
Politics is still an important element affecting states' participation in the 
review, and many states do not treat the improvement of human rights as 
the starting point of proposals for SuRs. 
The term "politicization," as defined by Rosa Freedman, "is used 
where political discussions [occur that are] unrelated to the particular de-
bate at an organization or body."1 8 3 The modalities and degrees of 
politicization in the UPR and the country-specific review of the Comnmis-
sion on Human Rights are slightly different. In the work of the Commission 
on Human Rights, political confrontations and "naming and shaming" of 
individual countries purposely occurred during the review process, and the 
reviews were selective and frequently contentious. This is an aggressive 
"explicit politicization" approach. Admittedly, politicization also exists in 
the UPR. Countries undergo individual scrutiny that can resemble the ap-
proach adopted by the Commission on Human Rights. 184 However, compli-
ance with principles such as universal review, non-selective equal 
treatment, and dialogue and cooperation can, at least in form if not in sub-
stance, contribute to the suppression of the "explicit politicization" phe-
nomenon in the UPR. During the Commission on Human Rights period, 
through politicization, certain major powers became "judges," while other 
countries with so-called abnormal human rights records often became 
178. See Freedman (2011), supra note 27. 
179. See Smith, supra note 164, at 52. 
180. See Freedman (2011), supra note 27, at 309. 
181. See Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, An NGO Assessment of the New Mecha-
nism of the UN Human Rights Council, 9 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 203, 211-13 (2009). 
182. Human Rights Council, Joint NGO Statement on Item 6, 8th Sess. (June 13, 
2008), http://olddoc.ishr.ch/ca/statements-council/otherngos/upr statement-final_13 
june 2008.pdf. 
183. See Freedman (2013), supra note 27, at 210. 
184. See id. at 220-23. 
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"judged." Countries attacked on human rights grounds might have regarded 
the attacks as selective political confrontations that deviated from the pur-
pose of the Commission on Human Rights. In contrast, in the UPR, each 
country has the potential to become the target of criticism from other coun-
tries. In this context, confrontation and "naming and shaming" usually are 
not good behavioral choices for recommending countries. Therefore, in the 
UPR, politicization rarely shows itself in those forms. On the contrary, it 
mainly emerges in the form of tacit mutual cooperation, praise, or trivial 
recommendations. By following this kind of "diplomatic" pattern, states can 
tacitly exchange their recommendations for "friendly" positions from other 
states. This is called "implicit politicization," and it shadows the UPR in a 
more clandestine form. 
C. China's moderate response to recommendations 
China's responses to recommendations in the review are relatively 
moderate. First, China is not willing to accept recommendations that specif-
ically interfere with its own human rights policies. In two reviews, most of 
the recommendations accepted by China fall into categories 1, 2, and 4, 
while rejected recommendations primarily belong to category 5, most of 
which request a specific action by China. China's acceptance rate is low 
compared to the average rate of the international community. China's ac-
ceptance rate of category 5 recommendations is also far lower than that of 
the international community. In particular, if a recommendation includes a 
slightly more precise requirement than another on the same subject, even 
though the content of the two are roughly the same, China may reject the 
former and accept the latter. For instance, China accepted the recommenda-
tion "Take steps to an early ratification of the ICCPR" by Czech Repub-
lic 18 5 while refusing the recommendation "Move towards ratification of the 
ICCPR in the near future" by Norway.186 China responds to recommenda-
tions "according to its economic and social development."18 7 When recom-
mendations require concrete actions and do not accommodate China's basic 
public policy and actual circumstances, China will explicitly reject them. 
Examples include recommendations to abolish the death penalty, to accept 
the individual complaint procedure, to invite State Parties to investigate, or 
to extend standing invitations to special procedures. 
Second, the rate of implemented recommendations for China is lower 
than that of the international community, and China still has not submitted a 
185. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 54, at 1 186.4. 
186. See id. 1 186.11. 
187. See id. ¶ 186.17. 
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report on the implementation status of recommendations. The only true 
measure of the UPR's success, according to Sweeney and Saito, is whether 
states implement the review's recommendations and report back during the 
follow-up stage. 88 For the second cycle, only fifty-one states have submit-
ted implementation reports so far.1 89 A lack of implementation reports on 
the follow-ups will lead to failure in assessing the actual implementation 
status of accepted recommendations and whether the human rights situation 
has improved in a practical sense. 
However, it would be unequivocally wrong to regard China, in this 
regard, as merely perfunctorily engaged in the UPR. Over its two reviews, 
China accepted nearly 62% of recommendations. After the first review, at 
least 17% of recommendations triggered policy changes and influenced the 
human rights situation in China. In addition, as mentioned above, some rec-
ommendations China rejected in. the first review were ultimately imple-
mented due to the changes that occurred in China's society. For example, 
China refused several recommendations in both cycles to abolish the death 
penalty.1 90 But then, faced with increasing public pressure to limit the death 
penalty, it adopted the Amendment Nine of Crime Law in 2015 and abol-
ished the death penalty for 22 economic crimes. Therefore, China's partici-
pation in the UPR is not, as detractors have said, "without any underpinning 
substance."'91 
At the same time, it is necessary to observe China's attitude towards 
recommendations in comparison to the overall international community. 
SuRs often selectively accept and implement recommendations based on a 
variety of considerations. For instance, as of 2015, over two reviews, In-
dia's acceptance rate is only 30.5%, which is slightly more than that of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel, and South Sudan.1 92 The 
SuR may selectively and "euphemistically" reject recommendations, even if 
these proposals are objective and relevant. For example, during the review 
of the United States, Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Hongju 
Koh classified recommendations into three categories and responded to 
them accordingly. Koh stated, "several recommendations are plainly in-
188. See Sweeney & Saito, supra note 184, at 219. See also Freedman (2011), 
supra note 27, at 322. 
189. OCHR, UPR MID-TERM REPORTS, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/ 
Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx. 
190. See A/HRC/25/5/Add.1, supra note 54, at ¶¶ 186.17, 18, 19. 
191. See Smith, supra note 8, at 115. 
192. See UPR INFO, supra note 55 (India as SuR). 
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tended as political provocations, and cannot be taken seriously." 93 A SuR's 
rejection of a large number of specific recommendations demonstrates its 
consideration of recommendations is based on factors other than human 
rights. Moreover, many countries, including China, are unwilling to subject 
their freedom to act on human rights issues to too many restrictions. 
In the UPR, states have considerable freedom to accept or reject rec-
ommendations and whether to implement them. This is a concession the 
international human rights mechanism made to state sovereignty. Most in-
ternational human rights monitoring procedures are devoid of binding force. 
Making international human rights monitoring mechanisms mandatory may 
discourage countries from engaging and result in their severing connections 
with the international human rights system, which could eventually damage 
the universal application of the international human rights standards. For 
the UPR, the pursuit of universality necessarily means a sacrifice of 
mandatory-binding force. Therefore, the most important tasks of the UPR 
right now are to advance universal acceptance of the review, to spread the 
human rights concept, and to promote universal acceptance and compliance 
with human rights standards by constantly reiterating international human 
rights standards during reviews. At present, it is beyond the UPR's capacity 
to compel states to implement recommendations. It is essentially a moral 
pursuit to promote and protect human rights, which depends on states' in-
ternal legal system and ultimately on the universal commitment of all states 
to the value of human rights. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Rosa Freedman believes "one of the UPR's main tasks will be to en-
sure that it does more than merely giving [sic] the appearance of human 
rights protection."1 94 The statistics cited here indicate that during the UPR 
the human rights situations of each state were comprehensively reviewed 
through dialogue rather than confrontation, and in adherence to the princi-
ples of universal participation, equal treatment, and cooperative dialogue. In 
addition, nearly half of the recommendations triggered changes in domestic 
human rights policies. The UPR is a great advance, in form and substance, 
compared to the country-specific review mechanism of the Commission on 
Human Rights. The UPR has contributed substantially to the improvement 
of human rights policy implementation and awareness. Even so, "implicit 
politicization" undeniably continues to exist in the UPR, although it differs 
193. Hongju Koh U.S. Dept. of State Legal Advisor, Response of the United 
States of America to Recommendations of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(Nov. 9, 2010), www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150677.htm. 
194. See Freedman (2011), supra note 27, at 293. 
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from the "explicit politicization" of the Commission on Human Rights. The 
effect of "implicit politicization" is that the absence of specific action re-
quirements weakens the quality of a considerable number of recommenda-
tions and lessens their practical significance. 
The weakness of review is highlighted when the UPR encounters pow-
erful states like China. The fact that more than 70% of recommendations to 
China have low action levels indicates the strength of review on China 
should be improved further. Undoubtedly, there is a gap between China's 
active support and engagement with the UPR and China's moderate re-
sponses to recommendations. For China, however, these are not contradic-
tory. China positively supported and participated in the capacity building 
and operation of the UPR, which is based on recognition of its value, but it 
does not necessarily follow that China will approve and accept all the con-
clusions of the review. Practically, during the review process, China re-
sponded to and offered recommendations according to its established 
policies. China is not inclined to offer specific action recommendations to 
other countries or to accept specific action recommendations. The political 
logic behind this is China is neither willing to intervene through human 
rights mechanisms in other countries' human rights issues, nor does it wish 
to subject its human rights policies to significant UPR interference. This 
approach reflects the political principle of non-interference and the Chinese 
philosophy: "Do not impose on others what you do not wish for 
yourself."1 95 
195. Confucius, The Analects of Confucius (ilWt-T , Lun Yu,Wei Linggong) 
(EPrtTd, 4lIffA, Ji Suo Bu Yu, Wu Shi Yu Ren"). 
